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DEDUCTION, LEGAL REASONING, AND 
THERULEOFLAW 
RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW. A THEORY 
OF LEGAL REASONING. By Neil MacCormick. 1 




Neil Mac Cormick first put forward his thoughts on legal 
reasoning in a book entitled Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 
(hereinafter Legal Reasoning).3 MacCormick's aim in Legal Rea-
soning was to explain the nature of legal argumentation as it 
manifests itself in court decisions.4 He focused on the legal sys-
tems of the United Kingdom, specifically English and Scots law, 
although he suggested that the claims he made about UK law 
deserve to be tested with respect to other legal systems, at least 
insofar as they are grounded in more general philosophical 
• 5 premises. 
Focusing on the process of justification, MacCormick argued 
that in the final analysis legal reasoning is about giving good jus-
tifying reasons for decisions.6 He explained that legal reasoning 
is essentially about applying rules to facts: "The simple but often 
criticized formula 'R + F = C', or 'Rule plus facts yields conclu-
sion' is the essential truth. "7 Accordingly, he took deductive rea-
soning in the form of a practical syllogism to be of central impor-
1. Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations. 
2. Associate Professor in Jurisprudence, Department of Law, Uppsala University 
(Sweden). I would like to thank Brian Bix for helpful comments on this review. 
3. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 1994) 
(hereinafter, MACCORMICK, LRLTJ. 
4. /d. at 7. 
5. /d. at 8. 
6. /d. at 15. 
7. /d. at x. 
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tance in legal reasoning: To justify a decision is to apply a perti-
nent rule to the facts of the case.8 He was, however, careful to 
point out that there is more to legal reasoning than deduction 
and that the non-deductive elements, such as the weighing of ar-
guments in difficult cases of statutory interpretation, are the 
ones most in need of study.9 
MacCormick also stressed the importance of universalizabil-
ity in legal reasoning. He actually spoke of "formal justice," not 
of "universalizability," but the idea appears to be essentially the 
same in both cases, namely that the judge "must decide today's 
case on grounds which [he is] willing to adopt for the decision of 
future similar cases, just as ... [he] must today have regard to his 
earlier decisions in past similar cases. "10 We might say that on 
this count, MacCormick follows in the footsteps of Herbert 
Wechsler. 11 
Since any ruling can be universalized, the judge must be 
able to decide which of two or more universalized rulings he 
should choose. MacCormick called this the problem of second-
order justification and explained that it must involve two distinct 
types of interpretive argument, namely (i) arguments from con-
sistency and coherence, and (ii) consequentialist arguments. 12 
For, he explained, any ruling must make sense both in the legal 
system and in the world. A given ruling meets the consistency 
requirement if, and only if, it does not contradict any other norm 
in the legal system; it meets the coherence requirement if, and 
only if, it makes sense in the legal system.13 Consequentialist ar-
guments, on the other hand, ask the judge to choose the ruling 
that yields the best consequences. This type of argument comes 
into play only if the arguments from consistency and coherence 
do not yield an answer to the interpretive question. 
In Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (hereinafter "Rhetoric"), 
MacCormick sums up the developments of his views on legal 
reasoning since the publication of Legal Reasoning. Here he 
maintains, inter alia, the following: in the case of statutory (and 
constitutional) interpretation, the judge should begin with a tex-
8. ld. at 19-52. 
9. I d. at ix. 
10. Jd. at 75-76. 
11. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
12. MACCORMICK, LRLT, supra note 3, at 103-08. 
13. MacCormick suggests that a set of rules is coherent if and to the extent that the 
rules can be thought of as pursuing some intelligible value or policy or can be subsumed 
under one or more 1ega1principles.ld. at 106-07. 
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tual analysis of the relevant provision; if a textual analysis does 
not yield a determinate result, he should proceed to consider sys-
temic arguments; and if neither textual nor systemic arguments 
nor any combination of these arguments yields a determinate re-
sult, he should resort to teleological (or purposive) arguments 
(pp. 121-42). As should be clear, this normative claim is a refined 
version of MacCormick's earlier claim that the judge should be-
gin with arguments of consistency and coherence and, if neces-
sary, proceed to consider consequentialist arguments. 
The central question in Rhetoric, however, is whether we 
can square a belief in the Rule of Law, which entails a belief in 
legal certainty, with a belief in (what MacCormick refers to as) 
the Arguable Character of Law, that is, the notion that the con-
tent of law depends on argumentation: 
Argument from commonplace propositions or starting points 
(topoi) [In this case the possibility and value of the Rule of 
Law, and the notion that the content of law depends on ar-
gumentation] is common in rhetoric, but the commonplace 
truths of everyday thinking may sometimes appear to be in 
flat mutual contradiction .... The idea of the arguable char-
acter of law seems to pour cold water on any idea of legal cer-
tainty or security. If there can be no legal certainty, how can 
the Rule of Law be of such value as is claimed? What pros-
pect can there be of reconciling these two? (p. 13) 
MacCormick offers an affirmative, albeit qualified, answer 
to this question: although we can usually rule out some proposed 
solutions to a legal problem as being clearly wrong, there is usu-
ally more than one correct solution to any given legal problem; 
legal certainty under the Rule of Law is defeasible legal cer-
tainty; and the right to argue one's case within this framework is 
grounded in respect for the Rule of Law (pp. 28, 277-80). 
He points out that his reconciliation claim, as I shall refer to 
it, depends on the assumption that the orthodox view about legal 
reasoning-according to which "laws do constrain adjudicators, 
because they are relatively determinate, and can be applied 
within a framework of justifying arguments that lead to reason-
able predictability of the uses of state coercion" (p. 30)-is ten-
able, and he therefore sets himself the task of showing that the 
"orthodox view" really is tenable (pp. 30-31). To do that, he de-
votes the rest of the book to a discussion of various aspects of le-
gal reasoning, including the role of deductive reasoning, the re-
quirement of universalizability, the nature and importance of 
consequentialist arguments, the ranking of the various interpre-
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tive arguments, the use and weight of precedents, the idea of 
reasonableness, the concepts of coherence and defeasibility, and 
the possibility of judicial mistakes. As one might expect, he ar-
rives at the conclusion that the orthodox view about legal rea-
soning is indeed tenable. 
I appreciate MacCormick's efforts to put (the theory and 
practice of) legal reasoning in the larger scheme of things, and I 
like the fact that MacCormick has an actual court case for every 
occasion-no matter what the issue is, MacCormick has a case 
that illustrates it. I am not, however, convinced by MacCor-
mick's reconciliation claim. The main problem, as shall be ar-
gued, is that the notion of what is rationally arguable is rather 
more indeterminate than MacCormick thinks. I also point to 
some difficulties in MacCormick's accounts of deductive reason-
ing, universalization, and consequentialist reasoning in law. 
I begin with a consideration of MacCormick's accounts of 
the role of deduction in legal reasoning (Section 2), the idea of 
universalization (Section 3), and the nature and role of conse-
quentialist arguments (Section 4). I then turn to a consideration 
of MacCormick's reconciliation claim (Section 5). 
II. DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
MacCormick maintains that deduction plays an important 
part in legal reasoning and he devotes two chapters to elaborat-
ing and defending this view. He does not explain what, exactly, 
deduction is, but we may say that a valid deductive argument is 
an argument in which the premises entail the conclusion: If the 
premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. 14 
MacCormick's basic claim is that legal reasoning has deduc-
tive, specifically syllogistic, structure (p. 43): 
(Premise 1) If OF [Operative facts], then NC [Norma-
tive Consequences] 
(Premise 2) OF 
(Conclusion) NC 
14. For more on logical validity, see, for example, MARK SAINSBURY, LOGICAL 
FORMS: AN lNTRODUCf!ON TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC ch. 1 (2d ed. 2001). 
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He explains that the legal syllogism plays an important 
structuring role in legal thought because it is within the syllogistic 
framework that arguments make sense as legal arguments: 
We go back to the point about what could possibly count as 
applying a statute at all. We go back to the issue of a conceiv-
able procedure for raising a case with a view to implementing 
a statute. That has an intrinsic logic of its own within which it 
is clear why the interpretative points and arguments have a 
real bearing as legal arguments. Moreover, this helps to re-
mind us why it is so important for a lawyer to be meticulous in 
sifting through every one of the universals or concepts de-
ployed in a statute, and figuring out their relevant ordering 
and mutual interaction or super- and subordination. Cases are 
won and lost through meticulous care-or its lack-in follow-
ing through every concept that counts, and testing rigorously 
for each one what particulars will count as an instance of that 
concept (p. 42). 
Although he does not say so, it is clear that MacCormick is 
concerned with the process of justification, which (obviously) 
concerns the justification of a legal decision, not the process of 
discovery, which concerns the person's mental processes in arriv-
ing at the decision. 15 As should be clear, the actual thoughts of a 
judge in arriving at a decision need not be reported in the opin-
ion he writes. For all we know, he might "see" the conclusion in 
a clear white light; even so he must write the opinion, that is, ad-
duce arguments in support of the conclusion. The question, then, 
is whether those arguments are good justifying arguments, not 
whether they really motivated him. In Legal Reasoning Mac-
Cormick emphasized that he was concerned with the process of 
justification, not the process of discovery/6 so one may wonder 
about his reasons for not stating it clearly that he is still con-
cerned with the process of justification. 
MacCormick insists that, contrary to what many appear to 
believe, deduction is as important in common law systems as it is 
in code systems (pp. 43-47). More specifically, he maintains that 
case law rules, no less than statutory rules, may constitute the 
major premise of the legal syllogism: 
15. For more on this distinction, see RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL 
DECISION; TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 25-30 (1961). 
16. MACCORMICK, LRLT, supra note 3, at 13-18. Indeed, he even said that "(t)he 
process which is worth studying is the process of argumentation as a process of justifica-
tion." !d. at 15. 
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In the nature of the case, the premises of any syllogism we 
start from in common law adjudication are weaker and more 
tentative or defeasible than in reasoning with statutes. But it 
is no less true that we aim towards a concluding syllogism 
whose premises have the full solidity that a good legal argu-
ment can secure. The elements of such interpretative argu-
ments are not essentially different as between common law 
cases and statute-based cases within common law systems. It 
would be quite extraordinary if anything else were the case 
(p. 47). 
We see that MacCormick's claim is not that the extraction of 
the ratio decidendi from case A is a matter of deductive reason-
ing, but that the application of the ratio decidendi (thus extracted 
from case A) to the facts of case B is a matter of deductive rea-
soning. So although the process of extracting the ratio decidendi 
from a precedent (or a series of precedents) is very different 
from the process of finding the pertinent statute (or statutes), 
the judge will proceed to apply a legal norm in both cases-the 
ratio decidendi or the statutory provision, as the case may be-to 
the facts of the case at bar. 
It should be noted that MacCormick's belief in the impor-
tance of deductive reasoning does not mean he believes that the 
judge is an automaton or that legal reasoning is easy. In other 
words, MacCormick is not a formalist who conceives of the law 
as a closed and complete system of legal norms and the judge as 
someone who decides the case before him in a mechanical way 
by applying a legal norm to the facts. 17 On the formalist view, 
textual interpretation is the only type of interpretation involved, 
and deductive justification from pre-determined premises is the 
normal mode of justification. But a belief in formalism is by no 
means necessitated by the belief that deductive reasoning plays a 
central role in legal reasoning. As Kent Sinclair explains, "[a]ll 
deductive arguments entail, or demand, their conclusions, but 
nothing inherent in the use of the deductive mode of reasoning 
guarantees that premises will be available that permit deduction 
of a conclusion requiring a given legal rule or settling all contro-
versy about it."18 
17. As MacCormick puts it in the chapter on defeasibility, "(t]he deductive element 
is rarely sufficient to conclude any contentious matter in law" (p. 237). For more on for-
malism, see H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-27 (1961); NEIL MACCORMICK, 
H. L.A. HART 121-24 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
18. Kent Sinclair, Comment, Legal Reasoning: In Search of an Adequate Theory of 
Argument, 59 CAL. L. REV. 821, 837 (1971). 
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I believe MacCormick's claim that deductive justification 
plays an important role in legal reasoning is sound and that his 
account of deductive justification is essentially correct. But there 
is a problem concerning the applicability of the laws of logic to 
norms and value judgments that is worth mentioning in this con-
text. A valid deductive argument, as we have seen, is one in 
which the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the con-
clusion. Accordingly, it has been argued that the laws of logic 
may not apply to entities, such as norms, that cannot be true or 
false, and that therefore-contrary to what most of us assume-
inferences involving norms, such as the legal syllogism, cannot 
be logically valid. 19 But while the applicability of the laws of logic 
to norms is an important foundational issue in deontic logic,20 
MacCormick is clearly allowed to disregard it in a book on legal 
reasoning aimed at legal scholars. After all, it does seem reason-
able to assume that the legal syllogism simply must be logically 
valid, even though it is hard to see precisely how. 
III. UNIVERSALIZATION 
MacCormick believes, as we have seen, that the require-
ment of universalizability is central to legal reasoning. In Chap-
ter 5 of the book, he contrasts universalism with particularism 
and maintains that universalization must be involved in legal jus-
tification. 
MacCormick considers the case of King Solomon, who 
faced the problem of deciding who of two women was the 
mother of a certain child (pp. 79-80). Solomon asked for a sword 
and said he would cut the child in two and give each woman one 
half of the child. But one of the women objected immediately, 
saying that she would rather give the child to the other woman, 
who in turn insisted that Soloman should go ahead and cut the 
child in two. Solomon wisely concluded that the woman who 
protested was the mother and should therefore be given the 
19. See, e.g., Alf Ross, Imperatives and Logic, 7 THEORIA 53 (1941). Like many 
other philosophers, Ross believes that norms or value judgments differ in this regard 
from statements (or propositions), such as "It is raining in Minneapolis now" or "Two 
plus two equals four." The underlying idea is that unlike statements or propositions, 
norms do not assert anything about anything, but only express the speaker's feelings or 
attitudes. For more on this underlying idea, see, for example, ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE 
CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT ch. 1 (1990). 
20. For an illuminating discussion of this difficult issue, see Carlos E. Alchourr6n & 
Antonio A. Martino, Logic Without Truth, 3 RATIO JURIS 46 (1990). 
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child-the real mother would of course never agree to have the 
child cut in two. 
This case is interesting, MacCormick explains, because it 
might be thought to illustrate a particularistic approach to moral, 
or, more generally, practical, reasoning. The idea would be that 
Solomon had a certain faculty of moral (or practical) intuition 
with the help of which he could arrive at the right answer to dif-
ficult moral (or practical) problems on the merits of the case, as 
it were. But, MacCormick objects, on closer inspection we see 
that Solomon was really making use of a universalistic approach 
to moral (or practical) reasoning, because he used his clever de-
vice only to figure out who was the mother of the child, and then 
ruled that she should get the child because she was the mother. 
MacCorrnick points out that the Bible's use of the word "be-
cause" indicates that when deciding this case Solomon was really 
saying that any mother should have her child. He puts it as fol-
lows: 
Once you know who is a baby's mother, you know who ought 
to be looking after the baby, into whose care she or he should 
be restored if in some untoward way they have become 
parted. If that were not so, it would be difficult to see what 
the 'because' amounts to. For the motherhood relationship to 
be a justifying reason, a 'because-reason' in this case before 
Solomon, it must be understood to be equally a because-
reason in any other case. In that sense, reasons are, and have 
to be, universalizable. To rationalize one's response by stating 
it as a reason in an objective sense ... is explicitly or implicitly 
to state it in universal terms. 'X being the mother of Y' is a re-
lationship that is a logical universal. It is instantiated in every 
case of this most basic process of animal life. If in any case 
one can with good reason say, 'Well, X ought to look after 
and nurture Y, because X is Y's mother' then one must be 
able to say so in every case (p. 88 (emphasis added)). 
MacCormick maintains that universalization thus conceived 
is part of the concept of legal justification. Although considera-
tions that motivate the agent may be particular, considerations 
that justify the agent's decision must be universal: 
There is, I submit, no justification without universalization; 
motivation needs no universalization; but explanation re-
quires generalization. For particular facts-or particular mo-
tives-to be justifying reasons they have to be subsumable 
under a relevant principle of action universally stated, even if 
the universal is acknowledged to be defeasible. This applies to 
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practical reasoning quite generally, and to legal reasoning as 
one department of practical reasoning (p. 99). 
129 
We see, then, that the requirement of universalizability en-
tails that a person claiming that p shall do X in C must say the 
same about any relevantly similar situation, or, if you will, must 
treat the case at bar as a member of a class of cases, and decide 
that case in the same way that he decides the other cases in that 
class. If, for example, you argue that it is legally right for a per-
son to perform a certain action in a certain situation, then you 
must argue that it is legally right for anyone else to perform such 
an action in such a situation. This means that universalizability is 
a matter of form, not content, and that, strictly speaking, it is a 
property not of norms but of rulings based on norms. That is to 
say, the universalizability requirement requires that the judge 
apply the norm to all those cases that are similar to the case at 
bar in relevant respects and only to those cases. Moreover, 
unlike generality and specificity, universalizability is not a matter 
of degree: A ruling based on a norm is either universalized, or it 
is not. 21 
On this analysis, the judge may not treat the case at bar dif-
ferently from the other cases in the same class, unless he can 
produce a principled justification for doing so. If, for example, he 
wants to apply the rule of lenity to fraud cases because they are 
criminal cases, he must apply it to drug cases, too, since they are 
also criminal cases, unless he can produce a principled justifica-
tion for applying it to fraud but not to drug cases. This means 
that one way to challenge a universalized holding is to point to 
the consequences (in a broad sense) of accepting it. If the conse-
quences are absurd, the holding must be rejected or modified. In 
other words, reductio ad absurdum arguments play an imgortant 
role when we are concerned with a universalized holding. 
MacCormick conceives of the requirement of universaliza-
bility as a substantive moral requirement, in the sense that he 
takes it to be grounded in a conception of rational impartiality 
(p. 91). This is worth pointing out because some argue that uni-
versalizability is rather a logical feature of moral words such as 
"ought" and "must," so that anyone who violates the require-
21. For a discussion of the difference(s) between universality and generality, see R. 
M. Hare, Principles, 73 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1, 2-5 (1972-73). 
22. This has been emphasized by Martin Golding. See M. P. Golding, Principled 
Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COUJM. L. REV. 35,41-42 (1963). 
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ment of universalizability must be contradicting himself.23 Either 
way, this requirement is at home in the field of law as well as 
morality. As Henry Sidgwick has pointed out, the idea that the 
application of the law "must affect equally all the individuals be-
longing to any of the classes specified in the law," is "involved in 
the very notion of a law, if it be couched in general terms. "24 
The requirement of universalizability is not without its 
problems, however. The main problem is to determine when two 
situations are relevantly similar since any two situations are simi-
lar in some and dissimilar in other respects. Here John Mackie's 
distinction between the three stages of universalization may be 
helpful.25 The first stage simply amounts to a rejection of numeri-
cal differences; any norm will be acceptable as long as it is being 
consistently applied. But, as a moral requirement, this is too 
weak to be of much interest. The second stage requires that the 
agent put himself in the position of the other person, in the sense 
that he imagines sharing the other's mental, physical, and eco-
nomic status, etc. That is, the agent must consider whether he 
would accept the proposed norm if he were in the other person's 
position with respect to race, sex, intelligence, wealth, etc. This is 
the form that universalization takes in ordinary moral argument. 
The third stage requires that the agent put himself in the position 
of the other person, in the stronger sense that he imagines shar-
ing not only his mental, physical, and economic status, but also 
his convictions, ideals, etc. 
As I see it, universalization in law may come in either of 
Mackie's first two stages, but typically involves only the first 
stage. Since in easy cases the relevant properties are specified in 
the legal norm in question, the judge's task is simply to apply the 
norm to all the cases covered by the norm and only to those 
cases. But in hard cases he ought to proceed to the second stage 
of universalization. If, for example, the question is whether a 
prohibition of racial discrimination in the workplace rules out 
voluntary affirmative action plans in the private sector,26 and if 
we assume, for the sake of argument, that the term "discrimina-
tion" is sufficiently vague not to determine the issue, the judge 
23. R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT chs. 1 & 6 
(1981). 
24. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 267 (7th ed. 1981) (1907). For a 
similar view, see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593,623-24 (1958). 
25. J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG ch. 4 (1977). 
26. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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ought to ask himself how he would feel about affirmative action 
if the plaintiff were black instead of white (or white instead of 
black). This, I believe, is necessary to do justice according to the 
law. But it would be unreasonable to ask a judge who approves 
of affirmative action to contemplate a situation in which he dis-
approves of affirmative action, and vice versa, and take such a 
preference into account. 
I conclude that universalization in law is a necessary, not a 
sufficient, condition for legal justification. This means that the 
universalizability requirement must be supplemented with a the-
ory telling the judge how to make the choice between two or 
more universalized rulings. Let us therefore turn to consider 
MacCormick's thoughts on this subject. 
IV. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN THE LAW 
We have seen that MacCormick maintained in Legal Rea-
soning that second-order justification must involve two distinct 
types of interpretive argument, namely (i) arguments from con-
sistency and coherence, and (ii) consequentialist arguments. As 
we have also seen, he defends a similar position in Rhetoric. His 
use of the term "consequences" is somewhat unusual, however. 
Consequentialism, as understood by moral philosophers, is 
a structural theory that holds that the moral value of actions, 
laws, practices, etc. lie solely in their consequences and that a 
person's moral duty is to bring about as good consequences as 
possible. 27 The best-known version of consequentialism is utili-
tarianism, which requires the agent to maximize utility. We may 
distinguish between act utilitarianism, which requires the agent 
to perform the act that maximizes utility, and rule utilitarianism, 
which requires the agent to act in accordance with the set of 
rules that would maximize utility if adopted. We may also distin-
guish between hedonistic utilitarianism, which conceives of 
goodness in terms of happiness (pleasure minus pain), and ideal 
utilitarianism, which operates with a more complex concept of 
the good that involves other things besides happiness.28 Since 
MacCormick emphasizes-in keeping with his insistence on uni-
versalization- that the evaluation of the consequences must fo-
27. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Introduction to CONSEQIJENTIALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 1, 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). 
28. For an analysis of this distinction, see J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of 
Utilitarian Ethics, in J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST}, 12-27 (1973). 
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cus on the consequences of the universalized ruling,29 and since 
he takes "consequences" to cover a diverse set of considerations 
such as justice, expedience, the needs of civilized society, etc.,30 
we might say with MacCormick that his theory resembles a form 
of ideal rule utilitarianism. 
Consequentialist theories may be contrasted with non-
consequentialist theories, which find moral value not only in con-
sequences but also in, for example, rule-following. A non-
consequentialist may hold, for example, that a person is morally 
obligated to keep a promise to a friend, even though he could do 
more good by breaking his promise and helping a stranger. 
Kantian ethics is a form of non-consequentialism, and so is exis-
tentialism. 
In Rhetoric MacCormick maintains that consequentialist ar-
guments are focused "not so much on estimating the probability 
of behavioral changes, as on possible conduct and its certain 
normative status in the light of the ruling under scrutiny" 
(p. 110). In other words, he maintains that the judge is, and 
should be, concerned not with the probability that certain conse-
quences will occur, but with the normative status of those conse-
quences should they occur. He illustrates the said with the help 
of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens31 (pp. 104-11), in which two 
shipwrecked seamen were charged with murder for killing and 
eating the cabin boy, having been out of food and water for 
about a week. The defense argued that a man might be justified 
in killing another in order to save his own life but the Court re-
jected that claim, pointing to the awful danger of accepting a 
principle that "once admitted might be made the legal cloak for 
unbridled passion and atrocious crime" (p. 105).32 MacCormick 
takes the Court to have been concerned not with the likelihood 
that this type of crime would increase as a result of an acquittal, 
but with the moral value of an acquittal. He seems to be saying 
that in acquitting the seamen the Court would have sanctioned 
an immoral act. 
But I doubt that judges are primarily concerned with the 
normative status of consequences. Consider, for example, the 
case of London Tramways (discussed by MacCormick in Legal 
Reasoning). I find it difficult to believe that Lord Halsbury was 
29. MACCORMICK, LRLT, supra note 3, at 115-16. 
30. Id. at 105. 
31. (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273. 
32. P. 105 (quoting Regina, 14 Q.B.D. at 287--88). 
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concerned with the "normative" rather than the "behavioral" 
consequences of adopting a strict doctrine of precedent when he 
pointed to the "the disastrous inconvenience of having each 
question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind 
rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in 
truth and in fact there would be no real final Court of Ap-
peal[.]"33 If I am right, MacCormick's claim about the nature of 
the consequences considered by courts is not true without quali-
fication. 
Finally, it is worth noting that consequentialist arguments as 
explained by MacCormick are related to the teleological (or 
purposive) approach to statutory interpretation as the general is 
related to the particular (p. 134). Whereas MacCormick asks the 
judge to choose the universalized ruling that yields the best con-
sequences on the whole, the teleological approach asks the judge 
to choose the universalized ruling that yields the best conse-
quences in light of the statutory purpose. The consequentialist 
argument is thus essentially a moral argument, which is less de-
terminate than the teleological argument. 
V. THE RECONCILIATION CLAIM 
I said at the beginning of this review that I am unconvinced 
by MacCormick's reconciliation claim, and I shall now explain 
why. 
MacCormick begins by arguing that the two commonplaces 
about the Rule of Law and the Arguable Character of Law are 
not really that far apart to begin with. 
In regard to the commonplace about the Arguable Charac-
ter of Law, he explains that he accepts "a fundamental constraint 
on the process of legal argumentation," namely the special case 
thesis put forward by Robert Alexy, which states that legal rea-
soning is a special case of general practical reasoning and must 
meet the same requirements of rationality and reasonableness 
that apply to all forms of practical reasoning (p. 17). This means, 
inter alia, that there may not be assertions without reasons. As 
MacCormick puts it, "whatever is asserted may be challenged, 
and, upon challenge, a reason must be offered for whatever is as-
serted, whether the assertion is of some normative claim or a 
claim about some state of affairs, some 'matter of fact"' (p. 17). 
MacCormick believes that if we accept this constraint, we con-
33. London St. Tramways Co. v. London County Council, [1898] A. C. 375, 380. 
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cern ourselves only with what is rationally arguable, in the sense 
that we "distinguish between the use of words as mere weapons 
of intellectual coercion or deceit, and their use as instruments of 
reasonable persuasion, where coercion appears only in the sense 
of the compelling force of an argument" (p. 17). 
In an effort to give more content to the notion of what is ra-
tionally arguable, MacCormick points to discourse theories, such 
as those advanced by Jtirgen Habermas and Robert Alexy.34 Un-
der this type of theory, we test a proposed solution to a problem 
by reference to an ideal speech situation, in which "all forms of 
coercion or interpersonal power or domination are put aside for 
the purposes of conducting ... interpersonal discourse" (p. 21).35 
MacCormick believes, as I understand him, that the discourse 
theory approach entails that although we can usually rule out 
certain proposed solutions to a legal problem as being clearly 
wrong, there is usually more than one correct solution to that 
problem (pp. 277-80). He therefore concludes that legal certainty 
under the Rule of Law can only be legal certainty within a 
framework that allows more than one correct solution to the le-
gal problem in question (p. 280). 
In regard to the commonplace about the Rule of Law, 
MacCormick explains that although legal certainty is an impor-
tant rule of law value, claims about the law by courts are always 
defeasible in that they may be qualified or overridden in unusual 
circumstances (pp. 28, 237-53). Accordingly, he maintains that 
we should conceive of legal certainty under the Rule of Law as 
defeasible legal certainty: 
All the care in the world may be devoted to preparing the 
source materials of law by legislators, drafters, or judges writ-
ing opinions that attempt to state a holding or ratio with ex-
emplary character. Whatever care is taken, the rule-
statements these yield as warrants for governmental action 
aimed at vindicating public or private right are always defea-
sible, and sometimes defeated under challenge by the de-
fence. Law's certainty is then defeasible certainty (p. 28). 
As MacCormick sees it, legal certainty, conceived of as de-
feasible legal certainty, is part of the Rule of Law, not a threat to 
34. See ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION: DIE 
THEORIE DES RATIONALEN DISKURSES ALS THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN 
BEGRL'NDU)';G (2d ed. 1991). 
35. P. 21 (citing J()RGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 109-12 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans.) (1988)). 
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it. His argument in support of this claim appears to be that de-
feasible legal certainty fits other aspects of the Rule of Law 
(such as the right of the parties to a trial to challenge every claim 
about law or facts put forward by the other party) better than 
non-defeasible legal certainty. He puts it as follows: 
The idea of the Rule of Law that has been suggested here in-
sists on the right of the defence to challenge and rebut the 
case made against it. ... 
After hearing evidence and argument, the court must de-
cide. In deciding about problematic matters ... the court may 
find it necessary and proper to develop a new understanding 
of the law, and thus set a new precedent, that may confirm or 
qualify prior understandings. At the end, the case is either 
dismissed as inconclusive, the defendant being absolved, or 
some order is made by the court and justified in the light of 
law as clarified through resolution of the problems posed. 
And then there is in effect a concluding syllogism. But it is 
rarely if ever identical with the starting syllogism. It is a new 
defeasible certainty that has emerged from posing problems 
about the old defeasible certainty and resolving them by ra-
tional argument (p. 27-28 (footnote omitted)). 
I have doubts about MacCormick's reconciliation claim, 
however, because I have doubts about his claim that legal argu-
mentation, conceived of as conforming to the special case thesis, 
is a matter of what is rationally arguable in the strong sense that 
MacCormick has in mind. In my view, the notion of what is ra-
tionally arguable is rather more indeterminate than MacCormick 
thinks, and this means that the framework within which Mac-
Cormick believes that the citizens can have legal certainty is 
rather more spacious than he thinks. This means, of course, that 
legal certainty within this framework can't be very certain. Let 
me explain why this is so. 
I agree with MacCormick that there will usually be more 
than one correct solution to a legal problem because I believe 
that both statutory interpretation and case law analysis depend 
on moral values, or at least morally relevant values,36 and that 
moral judgments can only lay a claim to relative truth or valid-
ity.37 Since there is no such thing as a moral judgment that is true 
36. For more on this topic, see Torben Spaak, Legal Positivism and the Objectivity 
of Law, in ANALISI E DIRIITO 253, 259--{)3 (Paolo Commanducci & Riccardo Guastini 
cds., 2004) 
37. As Gilbert Harman puts it, "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and 
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or valid simpliciter in this analysis, there can be no such thing as 
an interpretation of a statute that is true or valid simpliciter; in-
stead, an interpretation of a statute can only be true or valid 
relative to a given moral framework. In my view, this is one im-
portant reason- perhaps the reason- why there usually is more 
than one correct solution to a legal problem.38 
MacCormick does not accept such meta-ethical relativism, 
however (pp. 1-2). Although he doesn't pay much attention to 
meta-ethical questions in Rhetoric, he does say that he no longer 
accepts the non-cognitivism derived from David Hume that he 
accepted at the time of Legal Reasoning. He "remain[s] attached 
to the prospect of marrying in some way (yet to be fully ex-
plored) Adam Smith's account of moral sentiments with a Kant-
ian universalistic moral philosophy modified to allow of defeasi-
ble universalism .... " (p. 30). Why, then, does he believe that 
there is usually more than one correct solution to a legal prob-
lem? His position seems to be that this is just how it is: 
Just as it is notorious that practical reasoning proceeds in 
roughly the way I have been suggesting, it is also obvious that 
our practical reasonings and disputations are not infrequently 
inconclusive. When we think about how to argue over matters 
of practice, morality as much as law, we do notice that, while 
on some points we can hold quite conclusively that 'that view 
is wrong', on many other points there remain open questions 
where, so far as we can judge in practical terms, both views, or 
more than one view, is reasonable. Robert Alexy, on whose 
theses I draw here, argues that in our practical discourse and 
practical reasoning we can and do exclude many approaches 
to a question as being impossible because unreasonable. But 
among the surviving reasonable or 'discursively possible', an-
swers there can be a plurality of apparently open possibilities. 
There can be inconclusiveness not because reasonableness 
and rightness cannot be objective, but because it can be actu-
ally inconclusive among rival opinions (pp. 277-78).39 
injustice, virtue and vice, etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What 
is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a 
different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one 
true morality." Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism, in GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH 
JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY 3, 3 (1996). 
38. One might, of course, object to this line of reasoning that even if moral judg-
ments can be true or valid in a non-relative manner, we are still faced with the problem 
of finding out which moral judgments are true or valid and which are false or invalid in a 
non-relative manner. I myself find rather implausible the existence of objective moral 
values and standards about which we cannot have knowledge. 
39. P. 278 (citing ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE 
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But in the absence of a reasoned justification of the claim 
that there is usually more than one correct answer to a legal 
problem, one may have doubts about its precise import and, 
therefore, about its validity. More specifically, one may object 
that MacCormick does not give us a sufficiently good reason to 
believe that the framework within which (according to MacCor-
mick) we can have legal certainty is only as spacious as he sug-
gests, and not more spacious. That is to say, one may reasonably 
ask why one should accept MacCormick's rather modest claim 
that there is usually more than one correct solution to a legal 
problem, instead of the more radical claim that there are usually 
a large number of correct solutions to a legal problem. 40 
As I have said, I am not convinced by MacCormick's recon-
ciliation claim. While I am inclined to accept the claim that legal 
certainty under the Rule of Law is defeasible legal certainty, I 
find less convincing MacCormick's claim that legal argumenta-
tion concerns what is rationally arguable (in the sense outlined 
by MacCormick). My view, then, is that on MacCormick's analy-
sis, legal reasoning is too indeterminate to guarantee legal cer-
tainty, even defeasible legal certainty. 
Let me state in conclusion that although I am unconvinced 
by MacCormick's reconciliation claim, and although I have 
raised some minor objections to MacCormick's accounts of de-
duction, universalization, and consequentialist reasoning, I 
warmly recommend this book to anyone interested in the meth-
ods and techniques of legal reasoning in general, or, more spe-
cifically, in the question of the dependence of the ideal of the 
Rule of Law on the methods and techniques of legal reasoning. 
MacCormick is an engaging writer who knows his trade, and his 
works on legal reasoning in particular always repay serious 
study. His efforts to put legal reasoning in the larger scheme of 
things in the way illustrated in this book are commendable and 
will, I hope, inspire others to continue working on this difficult 
but very important subject. 
THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 207 & 287-
89 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacConnick trans.) (1989)). 
40. It is worth noting that MacCormick does not seriously consider the claim about 
radical indetenninacy of law put forward in the 1980s and 1990s by critical legal scholars 
such as David Kairys and Gary Peller. See David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 
GEO.WASH. L. REV. 243 (1984); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. 
L. REv. 1151 (1985). MacCormick is, however, well aware of the CLS critique of legal 
indeterminacy. See Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response 
to CLS, 10 OXFORD 1. LEGAL STUD. 539 (1990). 
